

1

2005.38-0

Comparison of the Engl. & Can. Law

Engl's Law. Husband & wife Can. & Scotch Law

1 The Husband acquires an absolute right to his wife's person & property

1 The same

2 ~~His~~ His right to her shops in action, is an absolute right to dispose of them, as he pleases, but if he does not exercise this right during cohabitation, in the event of the husband's dying first, they survive to the wife

2 The same

3rd In event of the husband's dying first the husband is entitled to administration of them without liability to account for them, this is effected by a Stat. of Can. and for it was not so at common Law, but they went to her administrator, to be distributed to her next of kin,

3 The common Law rule obtains with us

or to her executor if she made a will of them, which by com. Law she was enabled to do, and still is unless the Stat. referred too impliedly takes away that power, but if he neglects to take administration on the common Law rule obtains

4 The same. Probable, the granting of certain such judgments as judgments of fact & competency, and if so it may in this case be questioned whether the rule is just line the just acc. & pend. is unknown to us in this state.

As judgments obtained by barron and feme and either of them die before collected they go to the survivor

2 English Law

5th The chattels real of the wife in the event of the husband dying first, go to the wife as in choses in all the ground of it is that the husband and wife are joint tenants and they survive to the wife by the jus accrescendi

6th In the event of the wife dying first chattels real go to the husband by the jus accrescendi

7th The real estate of the wife remaining hers not as the wife may be with standing the marriage but during the coverture he is entitled to the usufruct

8th In the event of her dying first it descends to her heirs at law, under the incumbrance of the husband's curtesy. If the requisites to give her such an estate had taken place, if not it descends to her heirs without such incumbrance

9th In England the husband's curtesy lasts as long as the husband lives

Can Law
5th The law is the same only the ground in our law is the wife's choice in all the ground of it is that the husband and wife are joint tenants and they survive to the wife by the jus accrescendi, is not acknowledged as our Law. I see no reason why they should not, as they are in a position, go to the admiral, or to the executor of the wife's estate as the wife may be

6th The same

7th It is a question whether it lasts any longer than such time as the husband had taken place, if not the body of the wife comes of age if there is no such heir our law is the same as the English. This doubt is cleared up by a decision of the Superior Court

English Law

10

The wife may with her husband convey her real property, provided it is done by fine or recovery, and she must be privately examined concerning her free agency.

11 By the Eng Law the wife cannot convey her real estate to commence in futuro without her husband's assent for the maxim is, that a free hold cannot commence in futuro. But if she conveys with her husband by fine or recovery, it binds her and her representatives, and is every way valid unless defective.

The wife cannot devise her real estate being prohibited by a test of

428

Connecticut Law

3

She may do the same by ordinary mode of conveyance in this country without any private examination.

I see no reason why she may not without her husband convey her real property. The conveyance to operate when the curtesy is ended, for the maxim referred to has been nullified by a decision of court and is thereby done away by statute.

The wife may devise her real estate if this we are ascertained by a judgment of the superior court in that case there was the husband's consent. I see no reason why that should be necessary and right of his can be affected by the devise. We have a statute granting a widow may devise, with exception of those whom may not and in that act there is no prohibition to wife and there is no invalidity resulting from coverture. There was the could not issue the child in aliquo, their estate is joint and several &c.

A Long

Can not Law

Let them see the husband can
not by any probability, lose the real estate of the wife any longer than his right of usufruct can continue. But by a Statute of Henry 8th he may together with his wife so lease it, that it may last 40 years, provided he people exactly the requisitions of that Statute.

The wife on the death of the husband is, after the debts are paid, entitled to one third of his personal estate, if there are children, and to one half if there are none. But if he please he may deprive her from her whole, except her paraphernalia. The distribution to the wife as aforesaid is by Statute.

The wife is entitled to a share in all the real estate of which the husband was seized or seized during her coverture, provided the estate had been in circumstances that the wife could be seized of it. This estate the wife cannot be deprived of by seizure of the husband, nor by the claims of creditors.

Our Law the same as the common Law is stated to be

Our Law the same. by a similar Statute

Our Law differs in such and particulars, that she can be endowed and of that of which she died seized. This difference is effected by Statute.

and an

Con. Law

7

The husband cannot
divert away the wife's
paraphernalia, tho he
may dispose of them
during coverture, &
tho he is liable to creditors
when the personal
estate is exhausted,
but not until that time
and even then if it
has been exhausted by
special creditors, tho
it may not have been ex-
hausted by the real estate.
He shall come upon
the real estate to the
extent of such special
debts, if so much is
necessary to satisfy
them.

Quarta is
only the real estate
with us is liable to all
debts. I should then sup-
pose that both real
& personal estate should
be exhausted before
the paraphernalia
would be liable. For
it is apparent that
the principle of Law
is, that all the such claims
must yield to cred-
itors. It is to be pre-
ferred to Legatees
the difference ma-
king real estate to
subject to pay debts
generally, if effected
by statute

The husband with
the wife is liable for
all the debts of the wife
contracted while sole,
if collected during cov-
erture, but not otherwise

Same Law

The husband liable
civiliter with the wife
for her torts ~~if sole~~
while sole, if sued
during coverture

The same

69 Eng Law

The husband is liable civilly, with her for all torts committed by his wife during cohabitation in his absence, and without negligence committed in his presence or company with him

20 The wife can have separate property of her own both real & personal, in the former case the husband is not entitled to the usufruct, nor can he in any manner interfere with the personal. The latter she may alienate but not the first. Here sure she is prohibited by a Statute. She may acquire real estate by settlement of her husband before marriage, and by the intervention of Trustees after marriage, and sometimes a gift directly from the husband has been supported in equity. It may be acquired by the gift or devise of another to her for sole use

Can Law

Same Law

Same Law

only the wife may devise her separate real property

21

There is a custom in London
that a ~~some~~ sole covent may
be a trader as a ~~some~~ sole, in
derogation of the maxim of the
can law

No such custom

22 A ~~some~~ dowry may be barred
by a jointure settled on her be-
fore marriage, or after but in
the latter case she may abandon
her jointure & take her dowry

Same Law

23 A jointure must
be at least a ~~deaf~~ ~~repealed~~
estate

Our statute leaves room
to doubt whether a jointure
may not be of personal property
as well as real and if it can
it may be a curious question
what kind of property the wife
has in such a jointure du-
ring the coverture. It seems
to be a revival of the old Roman
marital law of ~~some~~ ~~ad~~ ~~affirm~~
coelestia, which was as we learn
from the regulations of ~~St~~ ~~offord~~ and
Lyndemare, an endowment of
personal property, and that
such property was the separate
property of the wife & that
therefore it was her will to be
used as though it were her property
after death

8 Englan

1600 Law

24 Eloping and living in adul-
tery, is a bar of dower.

The same

25 He is liable to fulfill her
contracts, where it is usual
for her to make such & which
he permits. He is liable where

The articles purchased came
to his use, or the use of his
family, except in some ca-
ses of extravagant conduct
on the part of the wife, &c

where he turns her out of the same Law

26 He is liable for her con-
tracts for necessities, where
he abandoned her he is liable
to her contracts for neces-
sities for herself and family
neither is it in his power
to prevent his liability by

withholding her from the trust
in these cases. He is not
liable where his wife leads
him without a cause.

27 He should not be liable
if he is not leaving
her is not known, he is
liable when they are
separated but not if he is
not with

eng law

Can Law 9

26

if some covert living with
her husband, having some
sole property such person
is liable for her contracts to
the extent of it.

Same Law

27th some covert separated
from her husband by arti-
cles of separation and hav-
ing a separate maintenance
is liable for her contracts
to their full extent.

I know of no reason
why this is not any law
being grounded upon
principles of justice, equity
and sound policy,
and I see no reason
why the circumstance
of her having a sepa-
rate maintenance
should make any
difference, and if it
is material, why
should she be lia-
ble to a greater ex-
tent than such pro-
perty. I apprehend
that the reason
she is ~~not~~ liable, is
not that she has
a separate mainten-
ance, but that she
lives separate

28th she may sue and be
sued as a feme sole when
her husband has objured
the realm, is banished, is
treasoned or is an alien
enemy

Same Law

English Law

29th Where there are articles of separation it is a complete renunciation of all marital rights to the extent of the articles, and always implies that the husband is no longer entitled to her services, as her person and cannot restrain her of her liberty

30 If the husband covenants ^{on his part} to give up all right that he has in her real property, such property she can effectually convey without him.

31 The husband is not liable for the wrongs of his wife criminally, unless for trespass or theft committed by her in his company

32 The wife is liable ^{criminally} for her own wrongs, except trespass & theft in company with her husband

33 For an injury done to the person or reputation of the wife she is entitled to the damages;

Connexion Law

Same Law

Same Law

Same

Same

Same

Eng Law

34 In such case if there is any special damages to him per quod confortum amittit, as any loss of property, he alone is entitled to an action

35 If I suffer an injury to her real property, if it affects the inheritance as a damage to houses & trees, she is entitled to the damages, if it is alone to the usufruct as an injury to the emblements, he is entitled to the Damages

36 The wife must be joined with the husband in every suit where the debt duty and damage would survive to the wife on the death of the husband

37 The husband alone regularly brings the action where the debt duty would not in the event of the husband's death

Connecticut

Same law

Same Law

survive to the wife, but it seems to be admitted that he may join the wife in case where the order properly has been the meritorious cause of the right of action

Same

38 If a feme covert brings an action alone which would survive to her if her coverture is not pleaded in abatement, no advantage shall be taken of it in bar.

Same

39 If a feme sole dies and marries she shotes her writ

40 If the feme sole is sued and marries, the writ quarets

41 Feme sole owes debts and marries these debts are not collected during coverture, they survive against her.

It is probable that the act here you admitted in the Bay courts that abatement must be pleaded to coverture and not in bar, will be thought novel

42 The action must be brought against husband wife where the right of action would survive against the wife, in the event of the husband dying first

43 The husband's estate is under the incumbrance of a mortgage and redeemed by the separate property of the wife

the husband dies the wife shall stand in the place of the M. ger and the heir shall not have it without redeeming it

Same

H4 The husband may dispose of the wife's paraphernalia during the coverture by grant, gift deed &c, tho not by will, yet if such disposal be only a pledge she shall have it, and if there is estate sufficient arising from the funds and of which the debts are to be paid, she shall be entitled to so much of the surplus, as may be necessary to redeem, before any distribution is made

Same

H5 It is a general rule that all contracts entered into before marriage by husband and wife are extinguished by the marriage, yet marriage settlements have been supported in equity, without the intervention of trustees

Same

14 English Law

Can Law

116 It is a litigated question whether a bond given by the husband to the wife whilst sole, in contemplation of marriage which by the condition could never be due till the death of the husband as a bond conditioned to leave her by will a certain sum was extinguished or not, such bonds have been supported in a court of Law, but however they may be considered in Law they will be supported in equity

117 A will by a feme sole is an marriage, revoked in case of a subscription submission of a controversy to arbitrament a marriage is a revocation of the submission

118 Husband and wife cannot be witnesses for or against each other, either in a civil or criminal case, altho ^{any} parties are agreed to receive their testimony. To this rule the case of treason is an exception so too the indictment of the husband for the ^{murder} of the wife on this subject the authorities

Spain, C. 33 & ~~from Spanish~~
 so where the dispute is to maintain to keep the man he is witness

Eng Law

§ 9 a marriage is held to be absolutely void if the requisites, required by the Stat of 26 Geo 2 are not observed which I do not see & it must be celebrated by a person in accord with the exception of Jews and Quakers

§ 10 The person in accord performs the ceremony by virtue of authority, derived from the royal not by virtue of his clerical character

Canon Ecclesiastical Law 17

The statute regulating marriages does not in terms declare a marriage void whoever may celebrate it. yet it declares that no person shall celebrate a marriage, unless it be a clergyman or some magistrate and that without certain preliminets. I believe that the general received opinion is that if any other person should perform the marriage ceremony it would be void.

The statute also requires publication and consent of parents. I believe that nobody can suppose that where these ceremonies were neglected that the marriage was void. I am at a loss why it should be in the former case, it is true, there a penalty is affixed to the former and none to the latter transgression. But whenever one is guilty of a breach of the statute, he is punishable for a misdemeanor, tho no penalty is affixed

§ 10 The same for if this was not the case their power to marry would be inextinguishable with their power in the gospel

§ 1. The statute of Hen 8 en-
acts that every person may
marry another who is not with
in the Levitical degrees, and
unless Gods law prohibits,
which is construed to extend
to cases of former marriage,
living the husbands wife
as the case may be, pre-
contract or impuberty. In
all these cases the ecclesi-
astical court will grant
divorces a vinculo mat.
but in none of these cases
except the former marriage
is the marriage absolutely
void. for if no divorce is
had during the cohabitation
nothing shall impeach
such marriage to be pro-
per the issue. But if a div-
orce is had during the co-
habitation it goes upon the
ground that the marriage
was void ab initio and the
issue are bastards. For a
convenient cause, as adul-
tery, propter scelus &c. when
a divorce is had before the
same cause, but it is a man-
er et thoro in the issue
is not bastards, and the court
may allow the wife alimony
and her chamber in some cases
to grant a divorce a vinculo
mat. for adultery

Only our statute the
causes of divorce are
fraudulent contract
3 years wilful deser-
tion, 7 years no head
of and adultery, the
inferior court grant
divorces in these cases
res. a vinculo, and the
issue are not bastards.
In cases propter scelus
& propter scelus
the assembly grant a
divorce either a vinculo
mat. or a maner et thoro
as a maner et thoro may
grant alimony. The in-
ferior court where they
divorce are empowered
to grant the innocent
wife a part of the hus-
bands estate not ex-
ceeding one third part
she is entitled to dower
It is observable that
our Stat is silent
as to precontract or
impuberty unless in-
cluded in the term
fraudulent contract.
As to former marriages
living the husbands
wife the second is
void and needs no
divorce. All mar-
riages within the Levitical
degrees absolutely void
with the exception of
the wife's sister

Eng Law

§ 2nd Husband and wife are divorced a vinculo matrimonii and the wife has a child and it is in proof that it was by her former husband it yet it is a bastard - a wife divorced a mens et thoro has a child, the presumption of Law is that it is a bastard but if it is in proof that it was by her husband the child is legitimate. If the husband and wife live separate by articles of agreement, and the wife has a child the presumption of Law is that the child is legitimate and nothing but impossibility of access on the part of the husband can make the child a bastard.

§ 3 When upon a marriage a settlement is made upon the wife I have not heard that any by the husband (not a jointure such as in bar of dower) the husband is considered in equity as the purchaser and so of the wife's portion, so that if the husband should die, his executor shall have his share in action

17

can

Probably the same Law

§ 4 The wife by marriage does not gain a new settlement, and the husband's settlement is said to be suspended during the cohabitation, yet when the determination of the cohabitation it revives again

I believe the received opinion in this state is, that the wife by the marriage with the husband gains a settlement with him, or at least if this having been a servant of her husband's settlement one year

Parent & Child

Same Law

1 Every child not born in wedlock is a bastard for a competent time after is a bastard

2 The child may be a bastard tho born in wedlock the principle by which to ascertain this fact, is that the child is a bastard, where access of the husband is impossible - but in the application of this principle, it was formerly held that there could be no other

evidence of impossibility, but
 only that the husband was
 not inter quatuor mura,
 but a more rational rule
 now obtains. Any evidence
 of absolute impossibility
 is admissible, as that the
 husband was in another part
 of the country &c. but proba-
 bility weighs nothing for if the
 wife lived in adultery with
 another man, yet if there
 existed no impossibility of ac-
 cess the child is not a bastard

The same

3 When the imbecility of the
 husband is demonstrable
 the child is a bastard

Same

4 But it seems if a man
 marries a woman with
 child, by another man, the
 child is not a bastard

I know of no such
 case determined by
 our courts. I pre-
 hend the doctrine
 very questionable
 possibly the husband
 and knew the
 fact, it might
 make a difference

of a bastard child in
not to any person, the
question is that he is p[ro]p[ri]e-
tary in his, so that there
cannot be any person to
claim as an heir

of a bastard child and
not be entitled to, un-
less he is a child
and his issue.

of a bastard may
acquire property by a
name, required by re-
putation, but no wife
limitation or grant, to
the adopter, child, if
such a person will accept
in a bastard, the heir of
def. not limited to issue of
card, as not bastard.

Of a mother policy may
prevent the bastard
from inheriting to his
parents as Legitimate
children do. But when
no such policy has
been made, as
where a mother dies
unmarried having
property and a bastard
child, why should not
the child inherit?
But I know of no case
decided by the courts
that militates
against the last line
of the Eng. law

The same law
unless it should be that
as a rule, that where
there is no child of
the bastard or any
issue of the child liv-
ing, that the mother
should inherit

I know of no case de-
termined by our courts
In the first case put, it may
be reasonable, as the intention
of the grant may fairly be
presumed to be that legitimate
children only should inherit
but nothing can be more re-
asonably argued than that
such a person will accept
in a bastard, the heir of
def. not limited to issue of
card, as not bastard.

8th Where there are hapt
and signe an mulier ^{propane}
the anceflor dies and the
heirland enters, and dies
reised, his issue cannot
be deposed ^{of} of, their title
by the mulier or his issue

9 The settlement of a boy
tard is the place of his
birth

10 Infants are not bound
by their contracts generally
but for necessities they are
The articles must be those
not only termed so but
must be necessary for the
infant in his then cir-
cumstances, that is, to say
he will not be bound by
a contract for necessities
if he is under the actual
gouernment of his parents,
Mofar or guardian, and
that gouernment is duly
exercised

11 The articles must not an-
y be necessary but reason-
able to the infants rank
and of a reasonable price
(i.e.) he shall not be bound
to pay more than such
price

Can Law²

I know of no case
determined

The settlement of a
heirland is, the settle-
ment of his mother
this is effected by a de-
cision of court

The same Law
and the stot upon
this subject I suppose
is in offen-
ence of the same
Law

The principle
the same

12 Altho an infant is bound by his contracts for necessities, as before explained, yet such security is given by him as precludes an enquiry into their validity, when they are void & under that ground I apprehend it is that hands, with penalties are void, negotiable notes when negotiated and bills of exchange are void when given by an infant but when no such reason exists, then penalties given by an infant for necessities are good as a note of hand not negotiable and a single bill

The principle the same, yet we have inadvertently considered notes for necessities good. But since with us the consideration of notes can not be enquired into any more than of penalties in Eng. to have preserved the Lawen like we ought to have considered such notes as void, as else in such case have relaxed the rule and suffered their consideration to be enquired into

13 If, we such security is avoided the contract is void

Same Law

14 Wherever an infant does an act which he would be compelled in a court of law, it is well done and he can not repudiate it

Same Law

Parent & Child

Can Law ²²

15 No decree will pass in Chancery against the infant without giving him a reasonable time to consider against it after he comes of age, this time in Eng Law is six months

Same

16 Contracts of any species by infants not for necessities, whether they relate to the rectory or personally are void as voidable, the principle by which this subject is governed is that the infant at pleasure may repudiate such contract, without any reparation being paid to the contract whether a fair one or not, this privilege is given to them to be used as a shield, to defend them against imposition, but is not intended, but is not intended that they shall use this privilege as an offensive weapon to do injustice.

Same

17 Contracts which respect the person, generally are not void but voidable, but should he after he comes of age confirm such contract, by a new promise or any act evincing it of his consent to it such contract would be good. Yet if it should be necessary to consider such contract as void, in order to give the infant

Same

that Collection which
his minority intitles him
too, in such case his con-
tract is void, as if he should
incure a forfeiture by
such contract, in such
case the Law considers it
as void, to put the
infant against the for-
feiture

18 Notwithstanding that
infants contracts are con-
voidable, yet it seems
that if he sell any property
and deliver with his own
hand, in such case he
cannot treat the purcha-
ser as a trespasser, but must
keep his property, and
then will be entitled to his
action. But if he sell some
and not make an actual
delivery and the vendee
takes it by force of the sale
the vendee is liable in
an action of trespass, and
damages

I know not whether this defini-
tion, it appears to me to
be a statute of privilege
either the Statute is a
trespasser in both ca-
ses as neither. I cannot
conceive of any reason
why a manual tradition
should make a difference
and I apprehend it should
not be reasonable to
consider him as a tres-
passer in either case
There is no necessity of
considering the vendor
as a wrongdoer, to
give the infant the full
benefit of his privilege
and it is time enough
for the infant to sue
when he has made it
known that he released
his contracts, otherwise
it might be improved
by him for the mis-
takes of reason, with-
out any advantage
to himself, and yet I
should suppose that the
infant had learnt that he
had sold his property
a trespass upon cre-
dit, he might consider
such contract void
and retort that, non-
est, wherever he
sued for it

19 An infants conveyance of his real property by fine and recovery, is not void but voidable, by the infant during his minority, but not after. If we are at a loss why the infants privilege should be thus curtailed, we are furnished with two reasons, which Eng lawyers seem to suppose are good reasons. It is a rule say they that every judicial act in infancy is to be tried in inspection of the infant, they suppose that an Eng court have regularly enough to know whether a person is an infant or not by looking at him, but if he are married at full age they will be at a loss to know whether he was an infant or not at a former period. I should suppose it was a safer way to enquire of the register, the infants parents, neighbours &c than to trust to the skill of the court in Pyromancy, another reason is given; that the record carries with it an ostensible evidence that the canon of the line, was not disabled by any thing to convey, this is to me wholly incomprehensible. True it would, prevent the avoidance during the minority which, it does not

We have no such conveyance as the fine and recovery, and of course none of the remarks applicable to them

2.6 Infant. Eng. Law

Can

20 Other conveyances of real property are void except by deed which is voidable only, this is an analogy to the actual condition of the land & the title

We have no conveyance, unless, in the case of a conveyance by deed, it is voidable only. It is voidable only, that is, in the case of a conveyance by deed, it is voidable only.

21 The infant executes a deed of gift, or a deed of sale, or a deed of mortgage, or a deed of lease, or a deed of any other kind, unless he acts indiscreetly, as in releasing a debt without receiving it, and so subject himself to a debt of fraud, in such case he shall have his privilege & void his contract

To me
Law

22 An infant sells an horse and receives the money, as buys an horse and pays the money, & then repudiates the contract, shall he retain the money, and recover the value of the horse in the one case, and retain the horse and recover back the money, in the other case? by the current opinion of the judges he may. This appears to be destitute of principle, for if the contract is repudiated, it is as if it had never been. It is unjust that the infant should take the property of another person without any consideration and use his privilege for the sake of fraud, it is unnecessary for

for the purpose of preserving him
from imputation: for this is effected
by his repudiating the contract, and
when that is done he ought to retain
the property thus received by him
It is said that the law presumes
that it was a gift to the infant.
Such a presumption is in direct
opposition to the nature of the
transaction; for when a man
pays his money for an horse, and
takes him away; there is no room
for presuming that he intended
to give the purchase money to
the vendor

I know of no
case where
this point
has been
decided

Q3 A contract for money loaned
to an infant to be laid out in
necessaries, and is actually so laid
out, may at Law be avoided, but
will be supported in equity, that
there should be such different
rules in different courts, I apprehend
is impossible, for if it is reasonable
that it should be enforced any where
I can find no solid reason why a
court of Law should not do justice
unless we are to suppose that Law
is something opposed to justice & reason

If it be a rule unreasonable
 then a court of equity is not
 warranted to support it. This
 disgraceful distinction has
 its origin in the narrow
 mode of thinking that
 no 20 Case included in
 the counts of Law. Opprest
 with the weight of prece-
 dents, formed in barbarous
 times, which counts of Equity
 freed from the
 shackles imposed by pre-
 cedent, render judgment
 under the influence of com-
 mon sense

24 Altho infants may re-
 form their contracts with
 a adult, have not the same
 privilege

Same Law

25 The infant makes particu-
 lar if it is unequal and unfair
 bargain, this he cannot refuse
 for, this is not compellable in
 conscience to do, if it be un-
 equal, he may refuse

Same Law

26th An infant heir that agrees
 to sell out, upon the 1000, pay-
 ment of 1000, and to the 1000
 agree to sell, he cannot refuse
 for, this is not compellable in
 conscience to do

Same Law

27. Altho the rule of Law is, that the infant as he represents to the only a contract made by the infant, yet if an infant of an age to dispose of his personal property, that is, at 14, should devise his personal property to pay this contract, as the infant had full power so to devise, the law is compellable in equity to pay it. I see no reason why the rule should not be the same in Law as equity, this whole matter being placed upon the record.

I know
disposable
as 14
the age
of disposing
of personal
property
is seventeen

28. An infant of the age of consent to me that is 14, may covenant to settle any particular estate upon his wife & issue and equity will enforce such contracts.

I know
of none
an this
subject

29. An infant after he is of the age of 14 is liable for his torts civiliter and criminatiter.

Same
Law

30. An infant is not liable in any case for torts civiliter or criminatiter under 7 years of age from that time untill 14 he may or may not be liable as he appears doli capax. This is the presumption is in his favor untill 10½ and against him after that age.

Same
Law

31. An infant is not liable for any species of wrong viz slander untill 7 years of age

32. An infant is liable criminaliter for his fraud but not civiliter

33. Infants of 14 are liable for their wrongs, yet if that wrong is neither felonious nor tortious and is furnished corporally, the infant shall not be so punished, neither shall he be punished for a crime that is a mere nonfeasance as where a fine is laid if such persons do not build a bridge an infant is one whose duty it was to build, he neglects yet he shall not be punished

34. Parents are bound by the contracts of their minor children where they expect a benefit by the same

Same Law

The defunctum. For-
prehend unfounded
if he is liable criminal-
iter, it is because it was a
wrong for the same
reason as to be to be
liable civiliter, not
upon the contract,
but for the fraud
which induces the
contract.

Same Law

Same Law

as a ~~supposed~~ allowance is the only
 difficulty, it is settled that where the
 articles purchased come to the
 use of the Parent, and the contract
 is in the parents business, of such
 a kind as is usual for the minor
 to make, and the ~~parent~~ ^{parent} ~~of~~ 34 We have
 firm by discharging such like no such
 contracts, suppose he should give ^{beneficial} purchase
 him his time, to shift for himself, as that of
 would it not subject him? and in the courts
 one case the parent is liable the vacation
 against his agent, i.e. where no a judgment
 expenses are furnished to an infant, should
 build which he refuses to furnish
 and you will remark that the suppose
 recovery is by an action of debt, if we

35 An infant gives a warrant ^{serve on}
 of attorney to compel judgment against ^{the law}
 himself, the court on motion will ^{if infirm}
 vacate the judgment ^{that we shall}
^{confide}
^{with judg}
^{ment as his}
^{and who}
^{ever acted}
^{under it}
^{as the pr}
^{er}

36 Parents are not liable general
 for the debts of their children, if
 debts are done in their allowance
 in the immediate execution of
 their business, although they

32 English Parent & child
to their will yet they are liable

37 Parents and Grandparents
children and grand children, if
any are are compellable ^{in Law}
to support each other in case of ^{poverty} ^{the law}
erty, and where there is more than such a ^{share}
one is ^{then} liable, the propor-
tion of maintenance will be
in proportion to their respective
abilities, this is affected by ^{the statute}

38 Sons in Law are not obliged
to support their wives Parents
this is determined by an adjudication
of court not to be within the Stat.

the law
as before
judication

39 A man marries a pauper who can
not support her children. His not
obliged to do it

39 I know
if no decision
on this point
is proposed
the usage
is different

40 B. has estate and is able to sup-
port her children, then is ^{not} liable
but his liability determines with ^{the}
estate

same
Law

41 A judgment against an adult
and minor, the minor, not
being sued by his guardian
may be reversed in toto

41 It is only
in minors
it is not
minor, this
difference is
affected by ad-
judication of
court.

42 As the parent is entitled to the services of a minor child, and injury to the child by which he loses that service entitles him to an action per quod servitium

same

43 The last mentioned action is allowed by a parent, against a person who detaches his daughter, and altho the loss of service seems to be the ground upon which the parent brings the action, yet the usual damages by no means comport with this idea. It is apparent that under cover of loss of service reparation is meant to be made to the wounded feelings of the parent, and for the disgrace occasioned by such a transaction. The loss of service seems to be regarded as the smallest injury in the ^{other} case

44 The parent is entitled to an action in the case for enticement his child out of his service. There would he not be entitled to an action against the man who had corrupted his morals and led him to the commission of crimes.

45 As the parent is bound to maintain his children, an injury to his child which has occasioned him expense

34 Parent & Child Long Law
entitles him to an action on the same
case, and if this happen where there
is no promise, it may be recover-
ed in the action per quod servi-
tium amisit. being stated as a
ground for special damages
16 The parent may correct the
child with moderation. The only
difficulty is to ascertain when he
has exceeded those bounds. In
the opinion of the triers the child
was corrected more than he
ought to have been, or more
than they would have done for
the same thing, yet I do not
apprehend that this lays a suffi-
cient ground to subject the
parent. I conceive the parent
acts in a judicial capacity, and
for the mistakes of the under-
standing, of which blame is
not predicable he is not liable
but where his acts flow from an
impure or in legal lan-
guage he acts maliciously, under
the influence of unusual mo-
tives, in such case he may be

Parent & Child Eng-land

25

liable. And it may be true that the mode of punishment, will furnish strong evidence of this motive, it is not enough that the motives of the parent were of the most unjustifiable kind, the correction did not exceed the bounds of moderation in the opinion of the peers, he is not liable.

18 We read no such liberal re-
friction,
the parent
we have
er come
reliable
to learn
their chil-
dren to
read the
bible and
to teach
them the
Laws a-
gainst
capital
offences
in event
of their in-
ability to
do this, to
learn them
by heart
some other
dexter
mism

17 Parents may justify in defense of the child, and the child in defense of the parent.

18 Parents may educate their children as they please without restriction upon educating them in the popish religion.

19 Guardians in minority are entitled to be appointed.

20 Guardian in sacage is where the ancestor dies leaving an heir under age of 14, entitled to the fee of real property, in such case the person who is nearest of blood, to whom the inheritance cannot by any possibility

descent a guardian in real
 age. This guardianship extends
 to such real property, and
 the custody of his person
 but has nothing to do with
 his personal property. It
 lasts until the ward is 14 years
 of age, when such ward may re-
 lease his guardian.

There is no
 such guardian
 in real estate

§1 Such guardian is com-
 pelled in chance of to give
 bonds, or to account annu-
 ally, and may be displaced
 by the chancellor.

No Law

§2 A guardian may be ap-
 pointed by will, and such
 guardian is guardian of
 real and personal estate, and
 of the person of the ward
 such ward cannot release his
 guardian at the age of 14. he
 is liable to the same as a
 tutor in chance of a guardian
 and

There can be
 no such guard-
 ian, as we have
 no such stock
 far, that ever
 hope, and the
 long law de-
 ward upon
 a statute of

§3 If there is an infant
 and the father is living he
 is guardian liable to be

displaced as to the ques-
tion of his estate by
the one matter, but not as to
his person

54 The father is dead and
the mother is living, the
chancery court or
court of chancery appoint
a guardian to the males which
lasts until the ward is 14 years
old, then he elects his guar-
dian, subject indeed to the
ratification of the court, and
if no such election is made
then such guardianship can
never, until he is of full age
and this guardian is guar-
dian of the person & has date
of title both real & personal
and liable to the same con-
ditions as other
guardians, upon his appoint-
ment he gives bonds for the due
performance of the trust. The
mother is guardian to females
until 12, then they may
elect, but if they do not elect
the mother remains guar-
dian

same can
only the court
of probate app-
oint instead of the
ecclesiastical court
in Eng. and
no such distinc-
tion obtains, &
that the moth-
er is guardian
of the females

35 *Pratt v. Child* English
 Father and mother are both dead the
 Law the same as to males & females
 as stated in the foregoing case as
 to males

same

36 The guardian who
 is account with the
 parent. This may be effect
 ed even during the ^{life of the child} ~~guardian~~
 in a suit by the
 infant by his executor or
 administrator, if the necessity of the
 case requires it, guardian
 are ordinarily ad-
 led to account in chan-
 cery, tho an action of ac-
 count lies at common Law
 and in accounting. ^{the}
 the general rule to be
 that when the guardian
 has used the minor's mon-
 ey for his purpose, he
 must pay it with inter-
 est.

37 The case of the
 guardian, where upon the
 election of the ward, he
 is not compelled to
 account for the profits
 of the estate, if he neglects
 to interpose, he shall answer

The general principle
 are the same with this
 difference in practice
 that the ordinary mode
 of calling a guardian
 to account is by an ac-
 tion of account, & I
 know of no reason
 why it may not be done
 in chancery, if the be-
 nefit of the discovery of
 any thing is wanted
 that cannot be had
 in an action of account
 I should suppose that ac-
 counting in a court
 of probate would be
 conclusive as well
 the parties

for such neglect, if he purchases land in
the infant's name with the infant's money,
the rule is that if the infant requires it,
he shall account with the infant. For the
money thus expended with interest, and the
infant in such case will be trustee of
the land for the guardian, and compella-
ble in chancery to convey to him.

37 A court of chancery may issue an injunction against guardians committing waste.

58 When an infant sues it must be by guardian or procheinamy, and in the event of the case going against the minor, such guardian or procheinamy is liable for the cost. When an infant sues it must be by guardian and a judgment rendered against him without guardian is erroneous and may be reversed.

59 he reversed the settlement of the parent is the settlement of the child, untill the child by his own act requires a settlement

60 In case the father has no settlement, the settlement of the mother is the settlement of the child.

61 If neither father nor mother have any settlement, the place of the child shall be the settlement.

settlement.
64. The father is dead and the child by ne
act of his acquires a settlement on his mother

40 Parent & Child En Law | En Law

recesses new settlement for the child
 a new required settlement, the
 settlement of the child

63 The child bound
 of apprentice gains a
 settlement in the place
 where he last served
 his master for 40 days.
 an apprentice, is in no
 moveable from his
 master

The consent of authorities
 is that an apprentice can
 gain a settlement
 by common law, and
 the courts have said
 it was upon the ground
 of their being insepar-
 able, but that it seems
 is not a reason in the
 English Law

64 By a variety of Eng
 statutes the officers of a
 parish, which by Law is
 bound to maintain
 the poor, may pro-
 ceed against the reputed father
 of a bastard child and
 compel him to in-
 demnify the parish
 against being liable to
 maintain such child
 and

Our Law not only has
 in view to secure the full
 provision the Eng Law, but
 also to effectuate unequal
 maintenance of the child
 by father and mother, and
 gives the mother a right
 of proceeding against the
 reputed father, when a
 certain Statute by which
 she will procure by judg-
 ment of court a sum
 of money collectable
 upon quarterly execution
 equivalent to half the
 expense of bringing up
 the child, and half the
 living charges. These
 executions will cease
 if the child dies, before
 it is capable

Master & Servant Eng Law

1st Slavery is unknown to the common Law since villenage ceased

2nd Apprentices must be bound by indenture in writing, and this is by the common Law.

3. Such indenture is not assignable by the common Law, altho it may be done by the custom of London

4. Whatever property is acquired by the apprentice by his labour, is the masters, altho he has run away from his master

5. An hired servant leaves his master, the property acquired by his labour is the servants, and the masters remedy is by action

Connecticut Law

41
In this county villenage was never known. We have no common Law that slavery exists in this state, other than that arises from holding some black men in servitude in defiance of the Law of nature and the principles of the common Law. We thus have no any statutes recognizing such doctrine, altho we have those that cannot upon the existence of such a practice this is undeniable

Same Law

Same Law

Same Law

12 Master & Servant Law

Connecticut Law

6 The hiring a menial servant without specifying any time, is an hiring for a year

I believe no such ~~rule~~ has obtained, but such hiring is still of no effect, so must

7 The a person is not bound apprentice but lives with a master as such, the master is entitled to what he earns by his service, whilst with him, and can never be called upon to pay anything for such service, may or rect him as in other cases, and such servant is entitled to the benefit of using his trade.

The same Law, only we have no Statute as that of Eliz. respecting a seven years apprenticeship to any trade

8 An infant binds himself an apprentice as he is allowed to do by the 4th Eliz. if the is not liable on the contract in the indenture, & entitles the master to the right of a master, and the power to those of an apprentice

We have no Law by which infants can bind themselves apprentices

9 A justice of the peace may pursuant to a certain Statute bind persons as servants, and the overseers of the poor, may pursuant to another Stat. bind out poor children, males untill 21 female, till 21

We have a Statute enabling select men to bind out apprentices poor children, males untill 18 females untill 18

10 Apprentices bound out by justice, these justices may discharge them from their apprenticeship for the misconduct of the master

We have a Statute that enable a justice, for the procurement of the master to recumant of any description to bind out poor masters to the court, which court may discharge such servant from his masters service

Master & Servant. Eng Law

Can. 49

No such
Law for
raising a
revenue

11 Any that a justice may bind out a minor
nauper, apprentice to a master against
the masters will, and if such master
will not accept such servant he is
liable to a penalty

12 A master is liable upon the contract
of his servant, as a parent for those of
his child, where he has an express or im-
plied authority to contract

Same

13 A master may correct moderately
his servant as a parent may a child

Same

14 A master is liable for the costs of his
servant, as a parent for those of a child

Same

15 A servant may justify a battery in
defence of his master, and whether a master
or may in defence of his servant there
are a diversity of opinions.

I think
the master
or may
as well as
the serv-
ant

16 A servant is beaten so that the master
or loses his service, he is entitled to his action
resquad servitium amittit

Same

17 A servant is entitled away out of his mas-
ters service, or employed after it is known
that he has run away from his master,
the master is entitled to an action on the
case, against such enticer or employer

Same

18 A master may declare upon a con-
tract made with his servant, when ac-
ting for him, as upon a contract made
with himself

46 Master & Servant Law

19 The master is liable civilly for the fraud of the servant practised by him in the masters service

Same Law

20 Where a master is rendered liable to an action as sufficient in his property, the servant of care or fidelity in the servant is liable to the master

20 Same
21 Same

21 A servant comes to the possession of the property of the master by delivery of the master and takes it away animo furandi, yet it is common law this was not felony; by the Statute of Henry 8th this is made felony, yet if the servant has cured the property of the master, with a view to steal it, it is felony at common law

22 By the decision of our courts when an indentured apprentice gains a settlement, an apprentice cannot dissent, with the general law which gives a settlement to any person who dwells a year. Same at a Law

22 A servant if apprentice gains a settlement under the Stat. of Hen. 8th in the place where he resides the last 40 days, if not an apprentice by being hired a year

Bailment England
The general Laws of
Bailment

1st Wherever a person is
taken by virtue of an ~~execu-~~
tion committed to gaol,
the chief keeper of the gaol,
who is common only the sheriff
off of the county, and such
the officer for a on the
gaol, such keeper is liable
to answer to the creditors.
for such escape, and nothing
and shall excuse
the keeper, for such li-
ability, unless the escape is
effected by the sheriff or
some of the land, not a
mob or rebel army.
However numerous ar-
rangements, inevitable acci-
dent and the act of God.

2nd Where the escape is
negligent only, which is
in all cases where it is not
voluntary, with the excep-
tions mentioned in the
foregoing article, whether
the negligence was actual
or constructive only in
such case the keeper of the
gaol has a right to sue
the keeper, and if an officer
must be released him, and

45
Connecticut Law.

We have a statute that
has an exception
where the escape is thro
the insufficiency of the
gaol, it is not the li-
ability for the sher-
iff, who is duty it is to
the gaol, this statute
But in all cases as in
the Eng. Law, the sher-
iff & county are liable
with one difference, of-
fected by the act of God.
Which is that if the
escape is, or those who
aided him are of abid-
ity to pay, the county
is not liable — and
marked it is to be re-
marked that the
sheriff is not excused
even where the escape
was accidental
by the insufficiency
of the gaol, if there
was any actual neg-
ligence

No mention will
be made of the con-
necticut Law unless
different from the Eng.

1st Bailment + Cuv Law

and confine him in
gaol, before a judgment
by the creditor such, &c.
No man shall excuse him
from his liability, but not
after he is sued by the creditor.
But in that case, he may
not sue and confine the
debtor for his own secu-
rity.

2nd he may if he elects
sue the debtor, when he
has become liable by the
scope of the debt.

3rd If the scope was affected by
the assistance of others, the
keeper may sue all who af-
fected.

4th When the scope is neg-
ligent only the gaoler is li-
able to be sued, but in that
case there must be actual
negligence to subject the
gaoler.

5th Altho the Sheriff or his
clerk is liable civiliter, yet the
gaoler alone is liable cri-
minaliter.

6th When the scope is liable
the liability of the gaoler, the of-
ficer is negligent only.

Prailment English Law

147

8 In an action on the case and debt lies in the former case the court have determined that nominal damages may be given, while in an action of debt, the whole debt is the rule of damages.

9 Both of those actions were unknown at the common Law and are founded in the equity of a certain ancient debt.

10 If the sheriff does the action of debt he does with him.

11 When the officer is voluntary the sheriff is inevitably liable to the creditor, for he cannot retake, and if he should it would be false imprisonment. He cannot force the debtor when he has paid the money, but is wholly remediless. Even if the debtor should promise to pay him, or give him a bond for the purpose of indemnification, such promise & bond are void.

12 The creditor is not obliged to re-sent to the sheriff, and in such case if he re-sent to the debtor, who is by the direction of the creditor, taken on such execution, the Gaoler may retain him.

13 A voluntary return of the Gaoler to gaol in case of a negligent escape will prove as disadvantageous to the gaoler as recaption.

148. Bailment Eng Law

11c If a voluntary return of the creditor, in a voluntary same doubt. If he else, will justify, the goal to me unreason-
er in retaining him. but able
will not justify his liability
ty to the creditor.

12 If a creditor suffers a debt and voluntarily to of-
hope he can never release
him

If this is our Law, it
is unreasonable, for
suffering him to go
is no crime, and not
to be punished with
the loss of his debt.
neither is the release
a payment, and duty
an act that is liability
a negation of the
maturity, than it re-
ceive such a construc-
tion. cannot receive

16 There is no agent debt
and no in law the suf-
fering one to escape, dis-
charges both

Has it happened that
this should be a discharge
is to me incomprehen-
sible. It may be some
evidence of a pay-
ment of the debt, for
perhaps some pre-
sumption arises, that
the creditor would
not suffer the debtor to go
if it was not paid.
unless there does, it is li-
able to be rebutted by
showing that he received
nothing. If the Law had
made it the duty of the cred-
itor to imprison. It might
be said to be wrong, but
it is not

17 The gaoler has a right to retain the prisoner until his fees are paid

18 The gaoler is under no obligation to furnish the prisoner with provisions

19 A practice has obtained in some prisons of enlarging the prisoner in the extent of the yard is prescribed by the county court, and it is at the discretion of the Sheriff to indulge the prisoner with the liberty of the yard, and when indulged he may detain him of them at pleasure

20 A prisoner is not an inmate for a day within the walls. I apprehend there is no difference in the Law as it respects such prisoner and one upon execution, only that an action against the Sheriff must be an action on the case and not debt because before judgment there is no restraint of the demand

Such practice is universal in this state, & depends upon usage the extent of the yard is prescribed by the county court, and it is at the discretion of the Sheriff to indulge the prisoner with the liberty of the yard, and when indulged he may detain him of them at pleasure

An usage has obtained in this state of suffering such prisoners to go at large and no liability is incurred provided the gaoler has him in goal when the court sits to which the writ is returnable. Whether this has originated from a decision of court or not I do not know, but believe it to be probable

⁷ Bailment English

to a nextent Law


21 The judgment obtained against the gaoler in such action, will be, in case the escape is a man of property, only damages for the delay and disappointment. If he is a bankrupt, it will be the whole debt

The principles recognized by our authors. Then the county is here are the reverse of those they determined to give small damages if the debtor was a bankrupt and if he was not, the statute had enacted that no action could be maintained against the county.

22 A voluntary escape is a crime in the sheriff & if it is in a civil action, it will subject him to a forfeiture of his office and also to a fine at the discretion of the court.

23. If there is a volun-
tary escape in a criminal case, in such case the gaoler is to be punished as the prisoner would have been if he had been convicted.

In such case it is by our Law considered as a misdemeanor punishable as a crime at common Law



Innkeepers & Taverners

1st Innkeepers may exercise their profession without any hindrance or restraint of license, but that purpose from which authority, in too many cases, the public good are set up, those are occasional duties, may be indicted for exercising a nuisance, those persons who keep ale houses, &c. for the purpose of retailing liquors in small quantities, are under the regulation of certain statutes, and must have a licence from the justices of peace before they can exercise their profession.

2nd Taverners are obliged to entertain travellers, and if they refuse so to do without sufficient cause they are liable to ~~be~~ an action, if sufficient is rendered them.

3rd To refuse in such case is a crime indictable, and a misdemeanor.

With us the innkeepers, taverners, &c. are under the regulation of certain statutes, and are nominated by the author of the selectmen, constables, grand jurymen, &c. of the town, or county, and become all unless they judge the person nominated unfit for the service, the taverners useless.

On keeping Eng Law

53
can

4 The taverner is obliged to pay for the goods as if he were lost in his house unless they perish by the act of God inevitable accident or the open enemies of the Land

5 If the goods are put out of the curtilage, by the direction of the owner, and they are lost the taverner is not liable, as where the guest sent his horse to pasture, and he is stolen. If indeed he is lost in such case by the negligence of the taverner, as by having down bars &c then he is liable but that is upon the ground that a common bailee would be liable for negligence

6 If the goods are stolen by the servant or companion of the guest the host is not liable

7 If the guest deceives the taverner by informing him that his trunk or portmanteau contains nothing valuable, when there is, and they are lost the taverner is not liable

8 If a man leaves a article at a taverner

5thth Innkeepers. *Leather Lane*
and goes away to that he is no
host to the Tavern, and they
are stolen. he is not liable un-
less the person went off an hour
to return again and become
his guest.

9 A person to be entitled, to the
rights of a guest must be a trav-
eller not an inhabitant of the
Tavern occasionally at a Tavern
not a boarder &c.

10 A man who is on business,
and has arrived at the end of
his journey and stays at a
Tavern to day or week is a
traveller at a Tavern house.

11 The Innkeeper has a lien upon
the person & interests of his guest than
may obtain either to satisfy his re-
mands, or if the guest should go off
without paying, he may sue for
him, or take him up on a writ
without a warrant.

11 If the Innkeeper consents to the
guest should go off without paying
him, he cannot sue for the
money, but must rely upon the con-
tract.

A Innkeeper
can sue for
particular
sold to a per-
son
12th If a
traveller
goes off
without
paying
the liquor
is delivered

Innkeeper Long Law

54

12 If the Taverner retains the property, he cannot sell it when the extreme equals the value of the property. tho by the custom of London he may have it appraised to him. ^{No decision in this State}

13 The common carrier is liable for property lost at all events except the act of God inevitable accident or the open enemies of the Land

14 He has a lien on the goods delivered to him, and is not obliged to part with them untill he is paid

15 He is not liable in an action of trover unless he converts the goods to his own use, but in an action on the case founded on the custom

16 He is not liable if fraud has been practised upon him with respect to the article which he carries

17 That species of common carriers, postmasters are not liable for robberies of the mail

18 Such common carriers as ferry men & the like are not liable

22 So too the bailee to whom things are delivered to carry and ~~bring~~ reward, if not a common carrier, is not liable unless for negligence.

23^d. If damage is done by reason of the bailment being exceeded, the remedy is not trespass. But if the article was obtained with a view to exceed: he except I apprehend would be trespass.

24 At common Law if the bailee embezzled the thing bailed it was only a breach of trust but by the 8th of Hen 8th was made felony. yet by the late determination of the bailment was exceeded & claimed for the purpose of embezzling *unimmo furandi* it is felony. As we have no such statute the common law rule is our rule.

25 The Pawnee may use the thing pawned, if there is expense in keeping it, to the amount of such expense, and if the article is lost in using, the Pawnee is not liable unless lost by his negligence.

26 The pawnee if he uses an article that no expense in keeping yet the

Contracts Infant & Dumb
 an answerable for the act, & the law
 or if a purchaser buys of a child he will
 be secured in his title (viz) when the
 notice of the badness of such act.
 The natural person of this nature
 is not to receive credit as a person
 of law. Not because it is probable
 that he may be deceived, but where it
 is the natural probable consequence
 of such badness.

Contracts Infant & Dumb

1st The contract of an infant
 is void as voidable as has been
 explained under the head of Pa-
 rent and Child

2nd the contract of a dumb person is
 void as binding as explained under
 the head of Marston & Feme

3rd The contract of a dumb person
 is void as Lunatic may it Law
 be avoided. When the death of
 the Lunatic by his representative
 but not in his life time

approach
 not with
 us as
 void in his
 lifetime
 as after his
 death

4th If the Lunatic's contract can
 not be avoided it Law in the or-
 dinary mode of proceeding, yet as
 the King of England is the father
 & guardian of all the lands in his do-
 minion, a commission a commission

Contracts Eng Law

Can 61

may issue, and if Chancery is
enquire whether such person is
an idiot or not, and upon issue
issues found by those commis-
sioners a scire facias may issue
in the Kings name against the
grantee of the idiot, and upon this
writ, the idiots grant may be a-
voided in his lifetime

§ 20. 20 upon an application
in Chancery, by the attorney general
the contracts grants &c of such per-
sons will be rescinded in the
lifetime of the Lunatic and the
Lunatic is made a party it
will not insure the proceeding

but a contract entered into thro
duress, tho voidable, if the party will
confirm it when the duress is re-
moved is good unless the party dis-
avows and stands his rights, and sup-
posed that he was obliged to fulfill
it, the duress notwithstanding

§ 21. where a person is intoxicated
Liquors and driven into a bargain
the person who contracts with
him Equally will release agent

as we have
nothing the
~~idiot's~~ fact
in this coun-
try are des-
titute of the
protection
of so proper
a guard ~~can~~
this objection
of the Attor Genl
is an ~~obscure~~
ground

we can
therefore have
no such person
the contract
Our courts
will consider
the contract acts
of such persons
as voidable
by themselves

Why is it ne-
cessary that
the contract
to be released
against, should
be made
with him
and not with

62 Dues of Law

Such a contract if it is
unreasonable or un-
lawful

8. A contract that is man-
ifestly unequal, made
with a man of weak
mind, will be relieved
against in Chancery

9. A contract entered into
which was occasioned by
fraud, either as to fact
or the Law, a party who
is of this mistake did
not fully comprehend his
rights, will be relieved
against in Chancery

10. A contract obtained by
means of imprisonment or
duress per minas to our
life limbs or liberty is void
at Law

11. A contract of goods
and duress per minas to the
body will have the same
effect is doubtful. The
contract is void

into the infirmity
of the party making
such a contract
If any one makes
an unequal bargain
with such person, he
has taken an undue
advantage of his
situation

8. It is said that it is
upon the fact of
fraud, but they
admit. But they
admit that the man
is of intellect. The
inequality is not

sufficient ground
of this fraud, which
makes the disposition
as stated

It is in a narrow
saw which should
not

12 A security obtained by duress for a just debt is valid. But the original contract remains

13 A contract obtained by fear unjustly occasioned with here considered against in Chancery whether the act which occasioned the fear amounted to duress or not

14 If a contract is entered into occasioned by fear which is not unjustly occasioned, as a reasonable person, will be valid

15 Fraud as it relates to the essence of a contract, vitiates it at law so that when a deed has been executed induced to a fraud in the deed, the obligor may plead non est at law

16 When the fraud relates only to the consideration of the contract, such contract is valid at common law, and the party defrauded left to his remedy at law for the damages

17 Such contracts will here be adjudged against in Chancery on the terms of restoring all parties to their rights

18 By the Law merchant, and

If I understand that if a parent should lay hold of this circum-
stance to obtain an unreasonable bargain it would be relieved against

When the fraud relates to the consideration of it is total fraud the contract is void If partial the party defrauded is left to his remedy at law this is affected by a court

1871
19. The seller of a contract
wholly vacate such contract.

20. If a seller to B. in good faith that
is not his own, knowing it not to be
his own, and with a full knowledge
of the fact, he did not know a direct
liability is implied.

21. If a seller to B. in sound judgment
and warrants it to be sound, whether
he knows or not, it is immaterial
that he is bound by the warranty to
pay over in damages. If he knew
then is the warranty mingled with
the fraud, which will be a ground
for recovery of damages.

22. If the warranty must be at the time of the sale and not a previous statement or subsequent to the sale.
When no change in the warranty is made
after the sale, it is a warranty.
If the warranty is made after the sale, it is not a warranty.

23. If there is any misrepresentation
of the quality of the goods sold.

24. If it is immaterial whether the
deception is caused by fraud, or by
a concealment of facts. Such a
fraud can be proved by aught to be
implied.

24. As to B. an artifice, that is
not sound having a secret defect
with which A. was not acquainted

A neither warrants, false, affirm
or conceal, that he knows, so as to
bind against A. although in fact

suppose an
artifice that
by fraud been
imposed upon
A. by C.
then it de
fects, would
not an action
be maintain
ed by B. against
C.

25. If the defect is visible defect & the
purchaser not blind, no action can be
brought as affirmation against, and totum
pro action

26. A contract may be avoided for
fraud & warranty persons to the
contracting parties are not deceived
as where A agrees to purchase his son
B. 2000 L. is a fact on 2000 L.
and to give his daughter D. 1000 L.
if a marriage is had between them
and B. and D. with A. to
pay back part of the sum. The
same rule prevails where there is
a contract in with creditors
a creditor and the others mutually
agree with one creditor to pay them
more than another, but cannot
be set off.

27. Where a man enters in
a contract by means of his agent and
to procure an unreasonable con
tract, such contract will be relieved

26
against incumbrance & will
surrender to Law no ground
for recovery of more than the
German imposed upon an intended
conceded. as the Parly case

28 A contract obtained by Opp.
an by imposed on him as a
man in undue advantage. In these
cases it is
necessary that a man, will here is the ground
lied against. and the usual and that the
absence of direct, ignorance circumstances
of in rights the unrepentantness is referred
of the bargain to a deficiency of one
of the price & a evidence upon the
which relief is had

29 A contract to do a thing in
notable in the nature of an agent
as to work 100 miles in
a minute are void.

30 A thing contracted Day if they lay a
to be done, is impossible for relief

31 A promise to pay 100 L when he
at worth 100 pence. yet is
a demand, as this is not what is meant
to be done, is not binding in the nature of
the contract.

31 he contract to do a thing possible at the time of contracting, which he comes impossible by the act of God. He is as the obligee. The promise is, discharged.

32 If a man covenants to convey that which he has not, & so it may become impossible for him to do it. yet he is bound by his covenant and liable to pay the Chancellor will not decree a specific performance

33 If a man undertakes to do a thing which by his own act becomes impossible as if a mortgagee conveys away. yet he has no remedy to make good upon the mortgagor, offering to redeem, and the Chancellor will decree a specific performance

68 Eng Law Contracts

34. If a man executes an obligation the condition of which is that it shall be void upon his doing an impossible thing the obligation binds, and the condition is void. But had the whole contract been detailed at length, in form of an agreement the agreement would have been void

35 A conveyance to Surtees upon a precedent impossible, or illegal condition is void

36 A conveyance to be defeated upon the ~~happening~~ performance of an illegal, or impossible condition is good without the performance

37 A contract where the consideration is unlawful is void

38 A contract to do an unlawful act is void

39 All contracts against the Law of nature, same positive statute, are inconsistent with reason & policy are void. The two former are void at Law

It appears that a hard word such condition is not the same more than the law is. It is a different fact, but is in substance the same as if detailed at length. If this is just the definition is not perfect in principle

40 Same contracts that are
against sound policy are
void at Law whilst others are
to be aided only in Chancery
among the former are con-
tracts to deprive a man of
liberty. not to till his land
not to follow his trade.
Wagers that have a tendency
to introduce indecent evi-
dence in a court as to wound
the feelings of third persons
to cover a bribe. to sell an of-
fice. among the latter, are
marriage Procuage bonds.
~~for~~ contracts for the expect-
ancies of young heirs

Perhaps all
wagers might
with Justice
be considered
as, void being
against sound
policy

41 Where A. promises B. money
to be paid on an illegal contract
tho B. performs in his part he
can never it from A

42 Where A says B. for doing an
unlawful act, and B. does it, or fulfils
an unlawful engagement, which he was
not obliged to fulfil, he never shall recover
the money back, but in this case both must
be in pari delicto

70 Eng Law Contracts

113 It seems to prevent a recovery of money paid upon an unlawful contract. Both parties must be in equal fault, for when it happens by imposed hardship, as in case of money paid upon an usurious contract it may be recovered back.

114 If the money has been paid to procure an unlawful thing, if the payer brings an action to recover before the act is done he shall recover, but if the act is done he shall not.

Perhaps the law would, to prevent the contract to be performed, from being performed, desert that there should be no more in such case.

115 Two persons are jointly engaged to pay money upon an unlawful contract, which by Law could never be recovered, if one of them pay the whole without the consent or privity of the other, he shall never recover the share of his partner but if his partner consents as is privity to the payment & does not object, he is bound to pay his share.

Contracts Eng Law

71

46 A promise to do a thing perfect by idle does not bind

47 A promise or covenant to do a thing, which when the covenant &c was made was lawful but becomes afterwards unlawful is discharged

48 A contract not to do a thing which by a law made after the covenant becomes the duty of the covenantor to do. such covenant is discharged

49 In the above case if a consideration has been paid by the covenantor, he may recover it back

50 If a man grants that which he does not even either actually or potentially, such grant is void

51 If, in the last case the grantor had received a consideration for such grant, it must be recovered back

52 At common Law a contract binding an apprentice, must have been in writing, and various other contracts must now be in writing by statute of frauds

53. When an Exr. or administrator
 contract to pay the debt of the testator,
 it must be in writing, it must
 be in writing to bind them in their
 private capacity

54. When one man promises to pay
 the debt or default of another, it must be
 in writing and signed by the party to
 be charged therewith, yet when there
 is a promise to pay for the debt &c
 of another person, if the remedy a-
 gainst the other were extinguished, or
 never existed it is valid tho not in writ-
 ing

55. If the remedy against the other
 is not extinguished, yet if by means of
 the contract the effectual recovery is
 rendered more precarious, the pro-
 mise is valid without being in writ-
 ing

56. That there is a new consideration
 for the promise is by no means suf-
 ficient to take the promise out of
 the statute

57. Contracts made at auction are
 not within the statute

58. Any contract respecting lands or any
 interest therein is valid unless in writing
 except lease for 3 years

We have
 no such
 exception
 as bases
 for years

59 The person who enters under a verbal grant, or lease of land at a certain price or rent agreed on, and improves is not a trespasser but tenant at will

60 In such case the tenant can hold nothing by the grant, neither can the grantor as lessor recover the price agreed on by virtue of the contract

61 In such case, the lessor will be entitled to recover a quantum meruit for the use of the land

62 If a contract within the Statute is made use of for the purposes of fraud ^{what} independent of fraud there may be in not fulfilling it, a court of Chancery will compel a specific execution of such contract, upon this ground it is, that contracts partly executed will be decreed to be performed

63 When a Bill in Chancery if the Defendant admits the contract by his answer he never shall be allowed to assist upon the benefit of the Statute

64 A declaration upon a contract which the Law requires to be in writing, there is no necessity to state that it was in writing it is enough that it comes out in evidence to be so

65. Where the Debtee draws up a contract containing contracts for himself as well as the Debtor ~~it is~~ and the Debtor signs it, which he accepts, the Debtor's signing shall be a signing for ~~both~~ the Debtee by his direction.

66. It is not material in what part of the instrument the signing is done, to give efficacy to the instrument.

67. A promise to marry is not the subject of the statute for when the statute speaks of promises in consideration of marriage it means marriage portion settlements.

68. A promise not to be performed in a year must be in writing.

69. If the performance depends upon a contingency, which according to the ordinary course of events may fall within a year, the promise is not within the statute, altho the contingency does not happen within the year.

70. It is essential to common Law that there be a consideration for every contract, which must be either good or valuable tho the quantum of such consideration is of no moment.

71. If a contract is reduced to writing and the consideration detailed at length, so that the consideration whole or in part might have been

appear, and in the view of the law is no consideration, such contract is not more operative than if it had not been reduced to writing.

Canneet No distinction between a written and sealed instrument obtains in this case. Ex. neither do I apprehend a court will give efficacy to a contract because it is written or sealed, merely to recover nominal damages.

72 Had such written contract been sealed, when the covenant appeared to be purely voluntary, and without consideration, a recovery may be had by the covenantor, but the damages will be merely nominal, neither will chancery decree a specific execution of such contract.

73 A contract may be reduced to writing and a valuable consideration acknowledged by the promisor, in such case the contract will become operative whether there was any consideration or not, because the party acknowledging the consideration can never be admitted to shew by hard proof that there was none, and not because the contract was written, for if the consideration is acknowledged, had been stated and appeared to be none such contract is not valid.

74 This a mere voluntary promise is not binding, yet a voluntary contract executed, as a grant, may be, and vests in the grantee

75 But in such case if any thing was intended by the grant other than to vest the estate in the grantee, then is the grantee a trustee to the grantor, which trust if it be an honest one Chancery will execute - but altho it is a trust between grantor and grantee, yet if made with dishonest views, as to defraud creditors, Chancery will not execute it, but leave the parties where the contract left them.

76 All such fraudulent contracts are as *Sanctum* against the grantor, between him and the grantee, but are void as to creditors

77 A part consideration
is not sufficient to ground
an action on a promise on

78 If A requests B to do an
act, and B. does that act, altho
it is of no benefit to A. yet if
he promises a reward to B
for doing it, the consideration
is sufficient.

79 If B. does an act benefici-
al to A. without request and
A promises to pay for it. Altho
the consideration is part, yet
it is not bound. but it would be
otherwise, if the act done was
beneficial to another

80 It is a doctrine acknowledged
to be Law in divers instances
that a promise to one for the
benefit of another, that the per-
son benefitted may sustain the

I apprehend that
is the case, where
if the promisor
performs his
promise, to the
promisee, the
promisee would
be a trustee to
the person in-
tended to be
benefitted

78 ~~Compassionate~~ Contracts
action, but the precise limits
of this doctrine do not appear
to be clearly marked

81 A contract of a lesser kind is
merged in the greater, so that
no action lies on the lesser
whenever the consideration of the
lesser kind does not appear on
the face of the contract. But if the
whole ^{contract} is detailed at length and
the consideration appears, tho' it
written or sealed yet an action
may be sustained upon the af-
firmavit and the writing given
in evidence

82 After a lesser contract is merged
in a greater, an affirmavit to pay
is nugatory for there is a remedy
on the greater contract

83 Altho no action lies on a subse-
quent promise to pay a debt due by
specialty, yet if the promise is made
for other consideration than the
debt in action lies

84 A contract or security of equal rank does not merge the first. but the promisee &c has a double remedy

85 In such case the obligee altho he may sue upon either or both securities as a single security as he has, yet he can have but one satisfaction, but he is entitled to his costs on every action

86 In contracts nothing is a satisfaction but a receipt of the debt due, yet in torts where more than one is liable, a judgment against one is a satisfaction as to all

87 Altho one bond &c does not merge another yet if a security is bettered by giving a shorter time of payment or adding another obligor in such case the first bond is done away

88 A contract may be good, and yet the security for such contract be void or voidable if void and voidable it does not operate upon the contract still if voidable it is a temporary suspension of the contract and when avoided the contract revives

89 A offers to B. an article for a certain price. B agrees to give it. if nothing more is done there is no change of property nor does any other lie for either, for non performance

80 Comparisons Contract,

90 But if A tenders the article to B who refuses to pay the price agreed on the price is changed, or if B tenders the price and A refuses to deliver it is the same

91 So too if a future day of payment is agreed on the property vests unless the vendor is to retain the property until that time in such case it is implied with B. to pay not but in the meantime if A. changes and B. pays at the time. B's sale is unaided

Usury

92 At common law no reward for the loan of money was allowable to take it was a crime and punished as such

93 In England it has been made lawful by sundry statutes regulating the rate of interest rendering void all contracts and securities for contracts in which more than legal interest was included and subjecting the person who takes such interest to penalties

Can. We have a similar statute with us the penalty is the amount of the sum loaned in Eng. treble

94 the rate of interest was first 10 percent then 8. then 6. but by the statute of Anne it is now the interest in Eng.

Can, with us in England it is now 6 Per cent

95. The man who reserves too much in the contract, directly, as where A loans 50£ and takes a note for an £100 he is guilty of reserving too much in the contract, and this fact being proved the contract will be avoided, but in this case he is not liable to the penalties imposed by the Statute.

96. If he reserves too much by any indirect means, as if he should loan 50£ in sell a horse for 100 more when it was manifestly worth not more than £20 and take a note for £100 he would also be guilty of reserving too much and his security would be void.

97. The man who loans £100 and takes a note for £100 an interest and afterwards compels the Debtor to pay more than legal interest, is guilty of receiving too much, as is by this act made liable to the penalties of the Statute, but the contract is not avoided, being originally pure and no subsequent corrupt agreement can affect the original contract.

98. A contract may be avoided and the lender made liable to the penalties of the Statute whenever he reserves too much in his obligation and then also receives too much. As where he

Lends 90£ and takes a note for £100.
here he reserves too much and the note may
be paid at the end of the year he has received
£6 interest when he ought to have received only
the interest of the 90£ lent. and has also in-
curred the penalties of the statute

99 If a man loans 100£ and takes a prem-
ium for the loaning it and a note as other
security for the £100 this note is void. for it
is the same thing as if he had loaned so much
less than £100 as the premium amounts
to. And if that premium surmounts the
lawful interest for a year of the sum loaned
the lender has also received too much and
therefore incurred the penalties of the statute

100 The offence of receiving too much is
complete from the time of receiving too much
whether that is at the time of the loan or afterwards
and from that time the statute of Limitation
(upon action for usury) which is one year
begins to run against an action for the pen-
alty.

101. This action may be brought by any person
as well as the person of whom the interest is taken

102 Interest may be received any time in the year and it is not usury

103 A. loans to B. 100 £ for lawful interest for 6 months and then B. pays £2. 10. 0 the half of the interest for a year. altho in this way A. receives more than 5 percent. per an. (for he has the interest of the £2. 10. 0 for the rest of the year,) yet it is not usury

104 When money is paid upon an usurious contract the payer may recover back the surplus of principal loaned and legal interest, for altho both contracting parties are participes criminis, yet the borrower is not in posi delicti with the lender

Law. If a case can be found in which the lender may with a good conscience retain the money so paid I do not understand why the borrower should recover it back

105 A. loans to B. on an usurious contract and takes a note &c for the money. which he sells to C and B. revives the note to C the usury is purged

106 A loans to B on a pure contract and then on a corrupt one, and in both in one security, which security B. may avoid. When he does it, it is a question whether the first contract revives in its pure state

Can. If we reason from analogy it would seem that the first contract was restored to its primitive integrity

107. It matters not whether there is one or more securities to a corrupt contract. They are all lost and parts of the same transaction & of consequence are all void

108. A contract entered into ~~for~~ⁱⁿ a country at legal interest, where the interest is greater or less than in that country where the suit is instituted to recover on such contract, the rule is that the interest of the country where the contract is made shall be recovered

109 A contract for legal interest is made in one country and the security for that contract is made in another. & where the security is given the rate of interest is less than where the contract is made - yet if the security is taken including the interest of the country where the contract is made, it is not usurious

Comparisons Usury

84

110. A contract securing greater interest than the interest of the country where the contract is made. if it has reference to another country and is there to be performed and the interest is not greater than the interest of such country it is a question whether it is usurious

Can. I apprehend that the current of authorities is, that it is not yet a total authority to the contrary is to be found in Dummer

111. A contract executed by continuance in one country where the interest is greater than of that country where it would have been performed executed were it not for such continuance, is usurious

112. Where more than legal interest has been reserved in a contract. if it happened by mistake either of Law or fact it is not usurious.

113. If there is a hazard of the principal loaned the contract is not usurious if there is more than legal interest reserved in it

114. Such hazard must be real not barely conceivable. and when the hazard is real no enormity in the interest will render the contract usurious. tho it may be relieved against as unconscionable

115 If this principle is to be referred the case of bottomry bonds, the purchase of annuities and in this state the letting of cotton to double in four years &c. which are not usurious

116 Where a man sells, not loans, for a great sum upon credit than he asks for cash in hand altho such sum greatly exceeds lawful interest yet the contract is not usurious. but if such sale is in fact to cover a loan. it is usurious

117 A contract to pay £100 in a year and if he does not he is to forfeit a penalty of £200 yet such contract is not usurious unless there was a secret agreement that such forfeiture should be incurred. in that case it would be usurious

118 Equity assume a jurisdiction over matters of usury, not upon the principle of voiding the contract. pursuant to the rules of Law of furnishing the loan as a crime. but upon the ground that an usurious contract is unconscionable, making the rate of interest allowed by Law, the standard. beyond which no man in good conscious can go. Therefore when equity relieves, it is upon the application of the borrower. and the contract by the decree of chancery is no farther affected than that the usurious interest is defaulted, and the borrower must pay the principal and legal interest

CON. By our statute when an usurious

contract is sued in a court of Law. the Debt may if he elects so to do file a plea in nature of a bill in chancery against the contract as usurious, paying relief, and the court of Law before which the suit is, is enabled to proceed to try the question as a court of equity. and by the same rule as a court of chancery, and by no other. and upon this ground it is that by the toto decisions contrary to a long,

but unfounded practice. the Debt who files his bill is not admitted as a witness unless called upon as a witness by the Opp in the case. If the case is determined in favour of the defendant. all the interest legal as well as usurious is defalcated. In case the Opp does not sue. the remedy of the borrower, must be as under the English Law.

119 A contract which by the terms of it requires that compound interest should be paid, is not usurious. yet no greater sum shall be recovered upon such contract, than if no such clause had been inserted.

120 A contract upon which simple interest alone is recoverable is not enforced in Law. after a length of time. say several years has elapsed. and interest is recovered and the parties agree to secure

the contract with the compound interest. and such security is given. such contract is not usurious. and the sum so secured with the simple interest. accruing after the security given, will be recovered.

121 The leading principle in computing interest, where there have been payments is to apply the payments to the interest and if there is then a surplus, apply it to the principal, and cast interest on the remainder, if the payment does not discharge the interest, but leaves a greater sum due than the original contract, you must not cast interest upon the sum so found due, but upon the sum of the original contract for no instance can you cast the interest upon the interest

122 Altho a contract not to carry and trade generally is void, yet a restraint of carrying it on at a particular place is lawful, but in such case there must be a consideration in fact, and it is not sufficient that the contract purports to be made upon a valuable consideration; the court will enquire whether in fact there was one

123 A conveyance upon a good consideration only, will be void generally against prior creditors, not subsequent creditors

124 Such conveyance will not be void in any case if the grantor left a sufficiency to pay his ^{debts} in such manner as precludes the idea that it was thus the act of the grantor

that the debt was lost. i.e. such conveyance shall not in such case, be evidence of fraud, for its being voluntary is not enough to render it void, against creditors, and they shall not defeat the just expectations of the grantee, because they have been negligent

125 The doctrine of fraudulent conveyances is regulated by the statute of 13 Eliz. but that statute is in affirmance of the common Law

126 Where there is a conveyance to avoid creditors it is not necessary that the grantee pay nothing for it. if he gives a consideration, but not amounting to the value, that is if it so far falls short of the just value, that we fairly suppose a trust on the part of the grantee for the grantor, then it is fraudulent, and the grantee can have no relief for his partial consideration

127 A conveyance may be fraudulent altho the vendee gave a full price, for if he did it with a view to assist the vendor to defraud his creditors, it is fraudulent — *Comper*

90 Comparisons. Contracts Fraudulent

128. A conveyance to one for nothing where there are no creditors, and there is a trust, the twist the parties is lawful, and such trust shall be enforced in equity

129 Its being voluntary is no evidence of any such trust, for it might be and probably was for the provision of some person, but if the circumstances in the case rebut all such presumption, then does the Law imply a trust whether the parties have declared one or not

130 A. purchases land or other article for B. with B's money, and takes a conveyance to himself, then is A. a trustee for B.

131 It is a rule that even contracts dependent officiously from consent, yet nothing can be more apparent, than in a multitude of implied contracts, there is no consent other than at the law supposes a man to give, when in justice he is liable. No more. Such supposition is often opposed to the nature of the transaction

132 Such implied consent sufficient to lay the foundation for an action, is not raised in every case where one man has got the money, & another, in his hands, without good consideration cannot retain, unless some principle of

133. Satisfies a recovery of the money out of his hands

133. So too where a man makes a grant, conveyance &c to the enjoyment of which by the grantee, some other thing is necessary which is not expressed in the grant, the grantor assents that the grantee shall have this thing is implied

134. So too if A should sell to B, the fishery of C in his possession in his presence claiming it as his, and B is silent, B's implied assent to the sale is supposed

135. A contract not to sue for a certain time is no bar to a suit within the time and if there is no bar, there is any remedy, it is upon the contract.

136. But a covenant not to sue still is a release and may be pleaded as such

137. It is a rule that where you declare upon an pleading writing, you must declare and plead according to the operation of Law upon that writing as in the case above

138. Where the consideration of the Promise &c is the promise of the other party, in an action upon such promise there need not be any averment of performance by the Plaintiff in his declaration for the remedies are mutual as the contracting parties

92 - Contracts (Comparisons)

139 Where there is to be something done before the Doft. is obliged to do, in such case the Offt must aver that he has done or tendered to do

140 Where by the contract something is to be done by each contracting party at a future period and it does not appear which thing is to be done first, either party to entitle himself to an action must do or tender to do. What by him is to be done, and of course must aver it in his declaration

141 If a man is by contract obliged to do a thing and afterwards a Law forbids his doing the thing entirely as agreed, yet leaves him at liberty to do part in kind with the whole agreed upon. If the other elects that he do that part he must, and altho no remedy can be had at Law upon such agreement, yet will Chancery decree a performance of what he can lawfully do.

142 Contracts respecting the realty may be specifically decreed in Chancery

143 So too, ^{altho} the party claiming wants nothing but money, which may be recovered at Law yet if that right arose from a real contract which Chancery will execute, for the other can having party so too will Chancery execute is on the other hand

144 A voluntary contract will not be executed in Chancery

145 The Law of a Court of Chancery to execute a contract is discretionary, therefore if there

is any unfairness in the contract, hardship, imposition, considerable inequality and want of mutuality &c Chancery will never execute it

146 A court of Chancery will relieve against a penalty and originally were the only court where relief could be had, but by the Stat of Anne a court of Law is invested with authority to render judgment for no more than the just debt, interest and costs &c

Can we have a Stat of the like kind

Executors

If the real estate descends to the heir, over which the testator has no control, unless embraced by the will, and is assets in his hands to pay specialty and judgment creditors, who may if they elect come upon him to the extent of assets received from the ancestor, & judgment is rendered against him of the lands &c in his hands. If he has aliened, the judgment is against him to the value, and the devisee is in the same plight as the heir. In case there are no such debts the heir or devisee, as the case is, receives the real property without being liable to pay any debts, altho the personal estate falls short of paying the debts.

Can the real estate descend to the heir, but is at the control of the Exr, in whole or in part if it

is necessary for the payment of debts, after the personal estate is exhausted for that purpose, is not assets in the hands of the heir as much as the payment of debts.

2. If the specially creditors should elect to come against the Exor, as they may, and by that means exhaust the personal estate, and have more to pay any or all the simple contract creditors, then such creditors may in many cases come against the Heir to the extent of specially debts which might have been collected of him, & such monies being equitable assets are to be divided among such creditors *pro rata* - Where the personal estate has been exhausted by special creditors, a legatee as well as a creditor may come against the heir but not against the Devisee -

Connect. - The real estate is at the command of the Ex^r but before it is used, the personal estate is to be exhausted. in that case the Ex^r is to apply to the Court to procure for an order to sell the real estate - which order it is the duty of the Court to give and the assets of such estate when sold are equally liable to the payment of all debts simple contract as well as others -

3. that species of personal estate called *paraphernalia* in altho not devisable by will is notwithstanding, the personal estate of the deceased & liable to creditors. that

9th
is as much of A's is over & above debt & need
say appraisel, yet it is not to be meddled with unless
the rest of the personal is then in such case if it is
taken & there were specially creditors who exhaust the
personal funds the widow shall in Chancery stand in
their place, as against the heir.

Connect. As the real as well as the personal estate
is the proper fund for the payment of debt, I
apprehend both are to be exhausted. before para-
phernalia are to be meddled with. In addition to
this when the estate is insolvent, certain articles of
personal estate are to be given to the widow, such
as by law are not liable to be taken on an execution -
and where the estate is solvent & very little remains
after payment of debts, a practice has obtained,
& giving a certain part to the widow, at the discretion
of the Judge of Probate -

10th. Voluntary creditors are to be postponed to all
other creditors, & to legacies - Connect. I
know of nothing in our law that appoies to this
idea -

11th. Any person of sane memory having property
who is of sufficient age may devise as much
a mill of his personal property. This age is 12 in
women and 14 in men. Females are

not an exception to this rule, not even feme covert, for where they have separate property their devise is good, so is their devise of a hope in which until it is reduced to possession by her husband it is her property, so too a devise of that which she has as executrix in after droit. The blind and unlettered are not an exception but the will must be read to them, neither are those born deaf and dumb, provided it is in proof from those who understand their signs that it was their design to make a will, and that they understood the nature of a will.

Corollary. The same Law except in this state the age at which one may devise is seventeen.

6th. Almost any person may be an Exor unless he is insane or excommunicated; minority is no exception, but such Exor cannot act till 17 years of age, and in the mean time admⁿ is to be granted durante minoritate.

Corollary. Law same only excommunication is no objection.

7. The infant's Exor acts at 17 and his acts are binding upon himself and others, yet if he should release a debt without receiving or any thing that would work a devastatⁿ, at the same an act would bind an adult Exor yet shall an infant have his

privilege and rescind his contract

8th Exr cannot be compelled to give bond for the faithful performance of their trust by the spiritual courts. Yet where an Exr. is in failing circumstances Chancery will compel him to give bonds.

Con. By a Stat. of this State an Exr must give bonds -

9th Administration must be granted to the Widow or next of kin that is to both or either, & if many are in the next degree of kindred it may be given to one, part, or all at the discretion of the Judge.

10th In computing who is next of kin the Civil Law is to be observed -

11th If the next of kin is under the age of 21. Administration must be committed to some other person, and in this case no respect is to be had to the next of kin -

12th No person can be appointed Adm^r except he or she is of the age of 21 -

13th Administrators are obliged to give Bonds for the faithful performance of their trust -

14th Where there is an Exr who dies without a will, his administrator is not Adm^r of the Ex^r's testator's goods not administered - but Adm^r de bonis non is committed to some other person & in this case no regard is had to next of kin & the same is the case where the Adm^r dies without completing his business -

15th It is the duty of the Ex^r: either to refuse or accept the Trust, if he neglects to do either he may be summoned & if he do not appear before the Spiritual Court where the business is done he is to be excommunicated.

Con. If he neglect his duty in this respect he is liable to a fine of £5 per month.

16th If the person named as Ex^r: does any act as Ex^r: before proof of the Will, he is bound to act, that is he is liable to all the burdens of an Ex^r: ~~for~~, whether he proves the Will or not, but can never maintain a suit without proving the Will.

17th Where there are two or more Ex^{rs}: & one refuses, yet may he in the life time of his fellow Ex^r: act as such & all suits are to be bro't in the name of all, but suits are to be bro't only against the Ex^r: who proves the Will, unless the other acts as such. — Con. Suits are bro't by & ag^t: the acting Ex^r: only.

18th If the Ex^r: who accepts dies & appoints an Ex^r: the last is the Ex^r: of the first Testator, altho' the other Ex^r: who refused is living.

19th The Ex^r: who died did not appoint an Ex^r: & the business is unfinished Adm^o: de bonis non is to be granted for the refusing Ex^r: cannot act, after the death of his fellow.

20th The Ex^r: is the owner of the Residuum after the debts & legacies are paid unless there is a legacy given him by the Testator. in such case unless the legacy is of some title as to get a just & mourning arising & the like

the Ex^r is not entitled to the residuum. but is trustee for the next of kin & must distribute such resid^m according to the Stat. of Distributions —

Con. The ex^r is not entitled to the residuum in any case.

21st The Court will not let in parole testimony to show that it was the intention of the Testator that the Ex^r should have the Residuum as tho he left him a legacy

Con. In our Law there is no room for such a Rule

22nd The Court will not let in parole proof to show that the Testator intended that the Ex^r should not have the residuum where he left no legacy —

23rd In case a Debtor is ex^r the Debt is a set off both for creditors & legatees but where there are paid the Debt is discharged —

Con. If this depends upon the Deed as I apprehend it does that the Ex^r is entitled to the residuum after debts & legacies are paid, the Doctrine is very disputable, in

Eng^l. where there is a legacy given to the Ex^r & unfounded in this Country where no such rule obtains —

24th It is the duty of Executors & Adms. to pay debts in the first place & in doing this they pay debts in the following order, 1st debts to the crown. debts provided by statute. 3rd Judgments & 4th specially debts. 5th simple contract debts and he should pay any debts of an inferior

rank not having paid the expenses, debts and assets fail. He must lose it out of his own estate.

Can with us there is no rank of debts except public debts and debts contracted for sickness are to be paid first, and the usual understanding of this is that sickness means last sickness, only and agreeable to this idea is the practice in the courts of probate. but as there is no such term as last

in our and in the statute and no discrimination as to that point, it must be considered, as each judge disposes

2^d As to the payment of debts of equal rank the Exr. may elect to pay which he pleases. He is exhausted at the assets and leaves nothing for the other creditors, unless priority is gained by suit if so that must be attended to.

Consequence, where assets fail to pay all the debts of the testator after his death, in this state no priority can be gained nor is it at the election of the Exr. but all the creditors of every description must have their shares, by strict average.

26 The Exr. having paid out the whole estate and having observed the priority of debts mentioned in any of such plead. plene administravit

Connee. Plene administravit is no plea in this state if there is any surplus, after paying state debts and suchness debts. For if the estate is solvent he has enough to pay all, if insolvent every creditor is entitled to his averageable share, and nothing except but the payment of that part, but after having paid public debts and those for sickness, plene administravit is a good plea

27 If the Exr. &c wastes the estate, and is so negligent that it is lost, upon his pleading plene administravit, the Court may reply a devastavit, and if that is found judgment is rendered against the Exr. de bonis propriis Connee. There is no such replication by a ~~creditor~~ creditor as devastavit, if the estate is solvent the creditor does not stand in need of it, if insolvent the creditor is entitled a part to his average only, and in making the average, the devastavit if any, was considered, as

14. *Comparisons. Ees,*

and if it appear afterwards, the creditor must
resort to the hand given by the Ees, for
the due performance of his trust, and if any
thing is ~~recovered~~ recovered upon the hand that will
be the subject of a second average among
all the creditors.

28. The Ees. de son tort does not exist
when there is a rightful Ees, an ad^r acting
unless he acts claiming to be that Ees, but
whenever he meddles with that estate is an Ees.
de son tort, and is liable to the creditors
to the extent of the assets by him received,
no further, if he plead false as that he has
not assets, when he has, he is liable to the extent
of the ~~of the~~ claim, but his having paid out the
assets gives only in mitigation of damages,
when sued by the rightful Ees, such Ees
cannot retain for his own debts, and when
sued he is sued as Ees of the trust with of the
creditor, tho in fact there was none.

Concl. Such character if admitted
would defeat the average law, for if any mo-
ney is to be had, altho the estate is insolvent,
it must be upon the principle of the Com

Law. for no provision is made in our Law by the statute respecting it, and of course if the Exor has assets sufficient, the whole debt will be recovered, when it ought to be paid through the negligent Exor's hands that an average might be made of it. Where an adm^r can have nothing to do with the estate, as in case of a fraudulent and avarice, no injury is done by supposing such a Character may exist in a civilized country is not.

29th The Bond given by the adm^r for the purpose of subjecting the bondsmen in an action, if the administrator does not pay the debts, for this the person injured has his action against the adm^r - but if the adm^r so conducts by not inventorying the estate, as enables him to defeat the creditors by pleading bene ad ministrat^{ur} or makes out false accounts, and procures the allowance of them so likewise if he does not distribute the shares among the next of kin, then is the bondsmen liable.

Connect. By our Law the Eer. is also obliged to give bonds, and if he does not distribute the distributary shares he is liable on the bond in the same manner as the Adm^r & Co apprehend. Where there is an Eer he has been supposed to be liable if he did not pay over a legacy. But is there not a difference. If he assents to the legacy. he enables the Legatee to recover, and if he does w^y sh^d the bondsmen be liable more than where he does not pay a debt. If he does not assent, there is no question but that the bondsmen are liable, as the Off^r can never repay a devastant, but is to recover his average, in making out the distribut^y. the devastant is ~~recovered~~ considered, it will be impossible for the Eer to avail himself of this privilege, but must suffer for the devastant of his companion.

3d If Co Eer is not liable for the devastant of his companion, unless he committed the care of the property to him, as signed some writing, acknowledging the

receipt of the property, and in this case
altho he did not warrant, for the other actu-
ally took it. Yet it is conclusive evidence
against him. That the property came in-
to his hands.

See the Can. Law above

§1 If an Ex. sues for a legacy, should plead
plene administravit. the Offt may reply a
denavit

§3 A Legatee sues for his legacy, either
in the spiritual courts or Chancery, unless
the legacy is charged upon the Land, in
that case he must sue in Chancery. An
Ex. however is liable in a court of Can
Law. where he has promised to pay the
legacy, upon such promise. And if he
has such legacy in his hands, such
promise is not within the scope of
frauds and perjuries

Cannee. We have no spiritual courts
but in lieu thereof we have a court of
Probate. But a legatee sues in a com Law court

As in the payment of Legacies. the Ex^r will pay the specific legacies in the first place, and if the assets fail so that the specific legacies cannot be paid, such an Ex^r is to be considered as having elected to pay the general legacies, and not the specific legacies, and shall not be liable to be sued by the creditors, whilst the assets are in his hands, and they shall abate. Possibly they are to be considered in this way, if used by the Ex^r to pay debts, in such case there is an abatement, but if taken by the creditor, as they may be, it may be considered as misapplied to the legatees, in the same manner, as if the legacy had been paid out of the assets.

If on failure of assets to pay all the ~~total~~ legacies, specific legacies are to be paid first.

If on failure of assets to pay all pecuniary legacies, they must abate in proportion among themselves.

If there be the whole estate given out in specific legacies, and then a pecuniary legacy given out of the estate, this is to be paid first, and is a charge upon the rest.

38 A specific legacy if lost and destroyed is
lost to the legatee

If in case the legacies are paid before a debt
the creditors must resort to the Exor and not
to the legatee, to refund - if he has taken re-
ceipts of him. If he has taken no receipts
of him he loses his debt. but why should
if such payment be considered as a
payment by mistake and be recoverable
back

Connec. under our statute. the Exor is not
in danger of being surprised with debts
for unless the debts are not in by a certain
time allowed by the court of Probate, they
are not recoverable. If he has not exhibited
his debt within the time limited. altho he
cannot sue the Exor, cannot he come
against the Legatee who has received his
Legacy?

40 In the case of the creditors not be-
ing paid, and Legatee, having received their
legacies and the Exor being unable to pay
the creditors he may come upon the Legatee,

41 As a simple contract creditor in France
shall come against the heir as debtor in

108 Comparisons Esors

in the place of specialty creditors, when they have exhausted the personality, to the extent of such specialty debts, so shall a legatee have the like advantage against the heir, but not against the devisee

Connect. Our system precludes any such Law

A2 Where a legatee dies in the lifetime of the testator, such legacy is lapsed and sinks into the residuum, but if given over in event of such legatee's dying, it is taken by the second legatee.

A3 Where a legacy is given to a legatee, at such an age, and the legatee dies before such age, it is lapsed unless given over.

A4 Where a legacy is given payable at such an age it is vested & transmissible to the legatee, or representatives, unless given over, at the death of the legatee.

A5 Where a legacy is given to one legatee and in case of his death it is given over, it is construed to mean, payable to the second legatee in case the first dies before marriage or 21

A6 Where a legacy is given charged upon real property, at the age payable at such an age

and the legatee dies before such time
the legacy is lost.

47. A legacy given by a parent to a child
payable at such a time. and no provision
made for the maintenance of the child
such legacy is an interest. if given by any
other person tis not an interest

48. A legacy is given to a legatee
payable presently such legacy
after a year has elapsed is an
interest. if the legatee is a minor
if an adult it is not an interest after
the demand of the legacy

49. A legacy is given payable at a fe-
stive day or presently either by parent
or another to an adult or minor but
payable out of a fund which yields
an annual profit it is an inter-
est without demand

50. To determine whether a testator
has in his lifetime adeemed a legacy
we must find that the testator had
animum ademendi for should he alien
the legacy out of necessity or pledge it

Comparing ^{vs} Express
to raise a sum of money this
is no evidence of such intention
and the Legatee shall be allowed
it against the Estate if there are
assets. If no such necessity could
be supposed to exist it is to be
attributed to nothing but an im-
pention of the testator to adorne it
So if the legacy was a bond and
this was voluntarily paid by
the obligor no such intent is appar-
ent or if paid by compulsion
if it was to secure the debt or a
necessity for cash induced it no
such intention is apparent.

51. Legacy of all my personal estate
includes all such property whether
acquired before or after making
the will.

52. So a Legacy of all the testators
money goods &c at such a place
all papers that were there at the
time of his death.

53. A devise of all the testators land does not pass
land purchased after making the will unless republished
or republished.

54 Even a republication of the will, will not pass after purchased lands that don't fall within the description of the words of a will. The will is supposed to speak from the time of republication.

55 A will is made giving a legacy to the children of J. S. at the time of making the will J. S. had no children, and after making the will other children other children are born to J. S. the after born children shall not take unless there was a republication, after their birth.

56 If J. S. had no children at the time of making the will. the after born children shall take.

57 A legacy is given to the children of J. S. & J. N. neither of them at the time of making the will had any children. after making the will they both have. but their numbers are unequal. the children of both take per capita.

58 A legacy is given to the children of J. S. who had no children at the time of making the will or afterwards. But had grandchildren: they shall take but not if J. S. had a single child.

59 A legacy is given to be divested or payed if the legatee marry. such restraint

Comparison of Executors and the Legatee

60 The testator may leg a legacy with a condition that the legatee shall not marry a certain person, at a certain age, before a certain age, in that case the age laid out must be reasonable the indulgence has been carried so far as to allow of the restraint, where it was not to marry a Roman Catholic, but such defection of any denomination is generally idle

61 A legacy left by a husband to his widow conditioned not to marry such condition is good

62 A legacy given upon condition that the legatee marry with the consent of a certain person, such condition is void in terram, unless in the event of such legatee marrying, without consent, the legacy is given away, in such case the first legatee loses his legacy

63 Where there is a marriage partion secured by articles or covenant, and the covenantor bequeaths a legacy to the person entitled, if it be equal or greater than the partion, it is a performance of the covenant, if less it is a performance pro tanto,

64 Where the testator owes a debt, and leaves a legacy equal or greater than the debt to the Debtee

the old rule was that the legacy when received was a satisfaction of such debt. which rule was gradually impaired, by requiring that the legacy and debt should be of the same genus and then that it should be payable at the same time and afterwards it was required, that there should be no general clause in the will directing all debts to be paid to make the legacy a satisfaction, and that a legacy to a bastard child was never within the rule. it was then supposed that there ought to be some expression in the will indicative of the testators intention that the legacy ~~was~~ should be in satisfaction of the debt. And at length it was determined that it must be expressed in the will that it was in satisfaction of the debt to make it so. which resolution reestablished the dominion of common sense after she had been dethroned for more than a century.

24
C. When a legacy ~~was~~ is given in a will & repeated in *testidem* verbis, it is but a legacy, but if given in different instruments as in the body of the will and then in the codicil or any other writing, such legacies are accumulative

66. The Legatee's right to the legacy itself depends upon the Exor's consent. that he should have it. so that in case the legacy is specific there is no doubt but the Exor may use that legacy in payment of debts altho there are assets without it and in such case it is out of the power of the Legatee to sustain any action against the Exor. that presupposes the property in the Legatee yet he may recover of the Exor the value of such legacy upon the ground that there are assets

67. A life estate may be created in personal property and the absolute ownership given over to another person by will

68. Such property cannot be entailed & if given by wards that would create an entail men in real property it acts absolutely in the same

consequence. As an entailment of real property with a reversion a life estate in point of duration may vary with personal property in this country

69 No remainder in a chattel real can be will be created after a life estate is the best of a greater distance of time than to a person in esse or 21 years after the death of a person in esse

Connect. In this state not only an estate in a chattel real but in all other estates in Land may be given to commence at a future time. provided the donee be a person in esse or the immediate descendant of a person in esse this is effected by statute it may not only be by will. but by deed

70 It is not necessary that a will, of personal property be subscribed by any witness.

71 A will is signed if the name of the testator is found in the will whether at the top middle or bottom, provided it is in his handwriting.

72 Nuncupative wills may be made of personal property subject to a variety of restraints.

By a statute of Charles 2nd no nuncupative will can be made of real property

Connect. The Statute of Car does not obtain here yet I apprehend a nuncupative will would not be admitted unless the situation of the testator was such as prevented his making a written will

73^d Ad donatio causa mortis usagif of a personal chattel upon condition of being valid upon his death, and to make it good there must be an actual tradition of the thing given, & it seems questionable, whether, a chattel in action not negotiable can be thus given

74 On the death of a person intestate, by the old common Law, the children were to have a rationabilis pars, the wife a rationabilis pars, and a rationabilis pars, was devoted to pious uses. — Probably a rationabilis pars meant one third. But as the bishops had the management of such estates by a delegated power from the crown, and being pious men they devoted the whole estate to pious uses, among which the payment of debts was not reckoned, so that creditors lost their debts & widows and orphans were beggared — these evils were remedied by a succession of statutes which have taken from the bishops this power over dead mens estates, so that now after payment of debts, the surplus of personal estate when there are children, is given, one third to the widow and the rest among the children and their representatives if there is no widow the children take all.
Can we have a similar statute

75 If the intestate has no children &c there is the personal estate distributed one moiety to the wife, another moiety to the next of kin and their legal representatives. If there is no wife the next of kin and their legal representatives take the whole. The next is placed upon a footing with the brothers and sisters, no preference is given to the whole blood, the half blood

connextant. If the intestate has no children &c then is the personal estate distributed one half to the wife and the other half to the brothers and sisters of the whole blood and their legal representatives, and for the want of such to the father and mother who are next of kin, and for want of such to the brothers and sisters of the half blood and their legal representatives, and for want of these to the next of kin, where there is no wife next claimants take the whole of the estate.

76 The computation of kindred is by the civil Law

77 No representation is admitted by sons and daughters and sisters or children in the collateral line but in the descending is admitted of inheritance

78 When claimants take by representation the distribution is per stirpes, when as next of kin, per capita

1. *Admission of the defendant*
 2. *Admission of the plaintiff*

Declaration in an action of assumpsit.

you must state a consideration, and
 state particularly the agreement from which
 it arises. The performance of promises
 was necessary to be done, and the other party
 to entitle him to an action. As per for-
 mance - demand notice. But in some
 cases neither of these are necessary. The 1st
 to be in which case he need not state them in
 his declaration. The 2nd must make out by
 his evidence, ^{substantially} the same agreement he has
 declared upon. Perhaps the words need not
 all be the same. But it must be so evidently
 the same contract, as that it need agree to
 the intent. As every will be a bar to it. If
 the declaration contains a promise to pay so
 much ^{lawful} money, and the whole of the debt, or part of
 a promise to pay so much money, and a certain
 sum, will support the declaration.
 In an action of assumpsit, you must state
 the indebtedness, and have it proved very generally

and raise the assumption. It is an error
 a day indebted, as was & Lohar, done, and
 in consequence Deft promised to pay
 quantum meruit. & Lohar goods sold
 Deft promised to pay quantum meruit
 the action for money had and received
 applies to a thousand cases of different complexion
 & manner in England the same for matters
 in every case. But the Offt must judi-
 cially give notice to the Deft. an writ ground
 the action is to be supported as what kind
 of money had & received means to prove
 with us the declaration is good, but the Offt
 not permitted to go into the proof of Estoppel
 & debt then that for money actually recd
 & if the Offt would prove this int. he must
 state it in his declaration. Browning & Morris
 v. per. Is this action the general issue
 non assumption. and this smother any
 defence is given in Evidence. Except for Eng
 the state of Limitations, which must be plead
 non assumption infra 60 annos. with no more
 than six years have elapsed. But the Deft
 must admit by his plea that he promised

more than six years ago. for perhaps neg-
liging the promise wanted to get it out of the Stat.
a waiver ^{must} (this is doubtful)
With us any act of the Off. by which the Debt
is discharged must be plead specially. as a re-
lease & ^{paid} and cannot be given in evidence
under full payment.

Of Limitations

If a joint obligor after the statute hath ren-
ounced the obligation. does any act which a-
mounts to a waiver of the Stat. It is a question
whether his co. obligor is bound thereby or
contradictory authorities in Kent. & Daugless
Foreign Attachment is thus by statute

If leaves the country being indebted to B.
C. is indebted to A. B. may by seeing A
obtaining a copy with C. describing him
as agent for B. &c create a lien upon the
money due from C. to A. If after this C
voluntarily pay it over to A. he will be
obliged to pay it also to B. Yet if A. the abso-
lute debtor before judgment on B's suit and
a *si re facias* thereon. sue C. the Garnishee, C
cannot plead the foreign attachment in bar
of the action. for in this way the law can-

the moment of a suit. however, false would
be a seal of debt and discharge the debtor
entirely. Suppose also the absconding debtor
had an Exec. on the same debt, it must be
levied and the garnishee may pay, liens
and Exec. and the money pass into the
specious hands with the levy and it, and the
garnishee for this purpose must inform the
files of the Exec. and it must be advised as
the garnisher (McCraw's opinion) This is
a rule that the garnishee is to be subjected to no
inconvenience in consequence of being
served with the reign attachment.

If B in the case put gets an Exec. upon a
reign against C, it must be served on the files
of the Exec. that is in 60 days, he takes his
lien upon the money in hands. The same
as the Exec. who does not sell the property
used upon within 60 days.

If C pays B, Exec. is a bar to a suit by B
against C. The garnishee may enter and levy
on the absconder, but he cannot shut the suit by plea
ing that he is not factor agent &c. far he can only
plead that upon the reign laws, and the judgment
thus obtained against the absconder, can only be made
use of to set out a reign laws upon against
the garnishee and can quash the reign against
the absconder. But this opinion cannot be car-
ried as settled, for the reign decision was 3 to 2.

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